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RESPONSE 
GET IN THE GAME OR GET OUT OF THE WAY: FIXING 
THE POLITICS OF DEATH 
Adam M. Gershowitz∗ 
N his insightful new paper, The Supreme Court and the Politics 
of Death, Professor Stephen Smith analyzes how the Supreme 
Court has floundered for more than three decades in a failed effort 
to eliminate the arbitrariness of the death penalty. As Professor 
Smith explains, the Court has politicized the death penalty and in 
doing so inadvertently stymied reform efforts. The general public 
believes capital punishment is reserved for the most heinous 
offenders while, in reality, the system is skewed in favor of death 
for those who have had the toughest lives and the worst lawyers.1 It 
is enough to leave an observer of the Court utterly despondent. 
I 
Yet Professor Smith sees cause for optimism in the Court’s 
renewed focus on substantive proportionality guarantees—namely 
the bans on executing the mentally retarded and juveniles—and 
the imposition of more rigorous standards for effective assistance 
of counsel. While I am in full agreement with his diagnosis of the 
problem, I part company with Professor Smith’s view that the 
Court’s latest approach might succeed where previous efforts have 
failed. To overplay a metaphor, the Court’s latest jurisprudence 
 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. 
1 See Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 Va. L. 
Rev. 283, 334–35 (2008). 
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amounts to the Court dipping its foot in the water and making 
some waves. Those waves might be bigger than the ripples in years 
past, but they are nevertheless small and inconsequential. 
Moreover, the Court’s decisions keep the public focused on the 
actions of the judiciary and allow legislators to skate by without 
taking responsibility for the systemic flaws that pervade capital 
punishment. If the Court desires to eliminate the arbitrariness of 
the death penalty, it needs to either take a major step forward or 
get out of the way so that the political actors can take 
responsibility. The Court’s categorical exclusions and renewed 
focus on effective assistance of counsel follow neither of these 
approaches and thus stand little chance of eliminating the politics 
of death. 
Let’s take the categorical exclusion cases first. As Professor 
Smith explains, the Supreme Court in recent years has determined 
that it is disproportionate to execute those who are mentally 
retarded or were juveniles when they committed their crimes. 
These seemingly sweeping decisions could easily convey the 
impression that the Court has taken great strides to remedy the 
arbitrariness of the death penalty by taking unpalatable defendants 
off the table. Yet we must first recognize that these groups amount 
to only a fraction of the death-penalty cases filed each year. Of 
roughly 110 to 350 death sentences per year,2 only a handful have 
involved juveniles in recent years.3 And while there have been 
more colorable cases of mentally retarded defendants, the greatest 
estimate puts the number at only 20 percent.4 Moreover, because 
the Court has refused to adopt a bright-line approach for defining 
mental retardation, that categorical exclusion will not forbid the 
execution of all who might be defined by some criteria as mentally 
retarded. 
2 See Robert Tanner, U.S. Death Sentences Drop to 30-Year Low, 
washingtonpost.com, Jan. 5, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/04/AR2007010401192.html. 
3 See Scott E. Sundby, The Death Penalty’s Future: Charting the Crosscurrents of 
Declining Death Sentences and the McVeigh Factor, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1929, 1952–53 
(2006). 
4 See Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital Punishment and 
the Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35 Akron L. Rev. 327, 327 
(2002) (“Estimates of the incidence of mental retardation in American’s [sic] death 
row population range from 4% to as high as 20%.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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Perhaps more importantly, while the categorical exclusions 
might appear to clean up problems with the death penalty, we 
cannot really be sure that those excluded are not truly deserving of 
death. Some juveniles and mentally retarded individuals are in fact 
highly culpable, such as the sixteen-year-old who plotted to kill his 
father, his father’s girlfriend, and her two young children and then 
engaged in an elaborate cover-up of his involvement in their 
deaths.5 Such highly culpable offenders now have a free pass from 
facing the death penalty, much to the chagrin of death-penalty 
proponents. Thus, it is hard to see how the Court’s categorical 
exclusions take any steps toward eliminating the politics of death. 
To the contrary, they seem to reinforce it. 
Turning to the Court’s renewed focus on effective representation 
for capital defendants, Professor Smith is surely correct that this is 
cause for optimism. But how much? During the last decade, the 
Court has issued three strongly worded rebukes of death sentences 
where the defendants’ lawyers were inadequate. And, as Professor 
Smith indicates, this seems to suggest that the Court is now 
demanding a higher level of representation for capital defendants. 
Yet the Court has not altered the main elements of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim—the defendant must still demonstrate 
both deficient performance by his lawyer and resulting prejudice. 
The Court has therefore done nothing to eliminate a core problem 
in such cases: that it is very difficult to demonstrate prejudice 
because a cold paper record of a lawyer’s trial performance often 
does not indicate what the lawyer should have done but failed to 
do. 
Thus, while the Supreme Court might be more incensed in a 
handful of cases, that does not mean lower courts will grant 
ineffective assistance claims with any more frequency than in the 
past.6 Indeed, at this point there is little evidence to suggest that 
5 See Adam M. Gershowitz, Imposing a Cap on Capital Punishment, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 
73, 101–02 (2007). 
6 See Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 Tul. L. 
Rev. 443, 497–99 (2007). Since the Court’s most recent reversal of a death sentence on 
ineffectiveness grounds in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005), there have been 
ninety-five executions. See Death Penalty Information Center, Executions by Year, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=146 (last visited Apr. 4, 
2008). Are we to believe that all or even most of those who went to their deaths 
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successful ineffectiveness claims will be more common in the wake 
of the Court’s trilogy of cases. While the Supreme Court hears a 
disproportionate number of capital cases each year,7 it simply 
cannot be in the business of completely reviewing each one on the 
merits. Thus, once again, the Court may have conveyed the 
impression that its heavy regulation of the death penalty protects 
against miscarriages of justice, when in fact it is able to do so in 
only a fraction of cases. 
Moreover, even if a larger number of ineffectiveness challenges 
were sustained by lower courts, that still would not ensure that 
states or counties will do anything about the underlying problem of 
under-funded indigent defense. Professor Smith argues that 
reversals for ineffective assistance of counsel will lead legislators to 
attack the cause of the reversals: the appointment of lousy or 
under-funded defense lawyers. Yet reversing a death sentence—
whether it be on ineffectiveness grounds or for some other 
reason—often leads states or counties in the exact opposite 
direction: pouring more resources into years of additional litigation 
and retrials. And indeed, to date, the response to the Court’s 
trilogy of ineffectiveness cases has not been a rash of additional 
funding spent on indigent defense. State and county officials 
preoccupied with budget shortfalls have hardly noticed that the 
Court is upset about the quality of representation in capital cases. 
This is not surprising when we consider that the Court’s three 
reversals for ineffective assistance of counsel happened in cases 
from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia.8 The former two states 
rarely carry out the death penalty in the first place, so even if they 
take the Court’s cue and bulk up their indigent defense funding, it 
will have little effect on capital punishment nationwide. And while 
Virginia carries out a fair share of the nation’s death sentences, the 
reality is that almost half of the nation’s executions occur in Texas 
received the quality representation the Court now seems to be demanding? I am 
doubtful. 
7 As Professor Doug Berman has repeatedly explained, the Court hears a 
disproportionate number of death-penalty cases that have very little effect beyond the 
cases themselves. See Robert Barnes, High Court Hears 3 Death Penalty Cases: 
Capital Punishment Accounts for Larger Share of Justices’ Smaller Workload, Wash. 
Post, Jan. 18, 2007, at A3 (quoting Professor Berman). 
8 See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (Pennsylvania); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 
(2003) (Maryland); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (Virginia). 
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and most of the remaining executions occur in the Deep South. If 
the Supreme Court has yet to reverse a single death sentence on 
ineffectiveness grounds from the states carrying out the vast 
majority of executions, why would those states rush to spend 
millions of dollars to provide better indigent defense 
representation? 
With the lack of legislative response in mind, the question for 
the Supreme Court then becomes the same one that Sean 
Connery’s character Jim Malone (who had just been shot and was 
on the verge of death) asked Elliot Ness in the 1987 film The 
Untouchables: “What are you prepared to do?”9 If all the Court is 
prepared to do is sporadically overturn a handful of convictions on 
ineffective assistance of counsel grounds, then the prospects of 
eliminating the politics of death are slim. 
There are big steps the Court could take to get in the game. The 
Court could raise the standard of proof in death-penalty cases10 or 
it could impose caps on the number of capital prosecutions states 
or counties can file in a given year.11 The likelihood of this 
happening is extremely slim. Indeed, the Court already tried to “go 
big” in Furman v. Georgia when it ruled all of the nation’s death-
penalty statutes unconstitutional.12 As Professor Smith explains, we 
have been dealing with the backlash and negative effects ever 
since. 
And so, in the absence of the Court really getting in the game, 
shouldn’t it get out of the way? As Professor Smith cogently 
argues, the Court’s three decades of involvement have only 
managed to make matters worse. The Court hyper-regulates, the 
public thinks things are under control, but death sentences are still 
arbitrary. If the Court ceased to nibble around the edges—
including the larger recent bites that Professor Smith identifies in 
his article—wouldn’t the pressure then come to bear on political 
actors to step up to the plate? For instance, the public might pay 
9 The Untouchables (Paramount Pictures 1987). 
10 See Craig M. Bradley, A (Genuinely) Modest Proposal Concerning the Death 
Penalty, 72 Ind. L.J. 25, 27 (1996) (arguing for jury instruction forbidding a death 
sentence unless jury had “no doubt” as to defendant’s guilt). 
11 See Gershowitz, supra note 5, at 78 (proposing caps on death-penalty 
prosecutions). 
12 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
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attention to legislatures’ failure to fund indigent defense and 
governors’ decisions to deny almost all clemency petitions. After 
more than three decades of failed judicial regulation, isn’t that 
worth a try? 
